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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a social decision making approach to evaluation can 
be generalised to interventions such as public health and national policies which have multiple 
objectives and impact on multiple constraints within and beyond the health sector.  We demonstrate 
that a mathematical programming solution to this problem is possible, but the information 
requirements make it impractical.  Instead we propose a simple compensation test for interventions 
with multiple and cross-sectoral effects.  However, rather than compensation based on individual 
preferences, it can be based on the net benefits falling on different sectors. The valuation of outcomes 
is based on the shadow prices of the existing budget constraints, which are implicit in existing public 
expenditure and its allocation across different sectors.  A welfarist societal perspective is not 
sufficient; rather, a multiple perspective evaluation which accounts for costs and effects falling on 
each sector is required.   
 
 
Keywords: cost-effectiveness analysis, decision rules, public health 
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1. Introduction 
 
The use of formal methods of evaluation to inform adoption and reimbursement decisions for health 
technologies has become well established.   However, there is a much wider set of policy decisions, 
including the implementation of public health interventions and programmes which could be informed 
by such analysis.  For example the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
has been given additional responsibilities for issuing guidance on public health interventions and 
national policies.
1 2
 One of the features of this type of guidance is that it is likely to have an impact 
across public sector budgets and the wider economy.  This poses the question whether the existing 
approach to the evaluation of technologies within the health care sector is sufficient to inform 
decisions across budget holders with multiple objectives and constraints. The general approach to 
economic evaluation in health care, and health technology assessment (HTA) in particular, can be 
characterised essentially as acceptance of a simple objective of maximising health gains (using some 
generally accepted pragmatic measure of health gain) subject to a single exogenous budget 
constraint.  This approach can be seen as a species of extra-welfarism
3 4
 since it represents 
significant departures from the customary welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis and related 
methods.  
 
Increasingly sophisticated methods of structuring decision problems, synthesising evidence from a 
variety of sources, characterising uncertainty surrounding decisions and establishing the value of 
acquiring more information to inform these decisions have recently been developed.
5 6
 These are 
beginning to be used to inform specific decision making  most notably as part of the technology 
appraisal programme at NICE.
7
  These developments have taken place in a somewhat sheltered HTA 
world where both the single objective and the constraint are taken to be exogenous and regarded as 
legitimate on the basis that they are given by politically legitimate social decision makers.  However, 
the simplification of constraints and objectives which may be reasonable when analysis is limited to 
health care technologies may not be appropriate from the wider view of the policies and interventions 
that are candidates for scrutiny in public health and wider social policy.   The question arises of 
whether the current societal decision making approach - used, for example, by NICE - is sufficient for 
these wider policy questions, or whether generalisations of decision rules are required. 
 
The current debate about which methods of evaluation should be used to inform these more complex 
decisions generally offers three broad alternatives: a somewhat ill-defined presentation of 
disaggregated costs and consequences (CCA); cost-benefit analysis (CBA) conducted from a 
welfarist perspective and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) which is commonly based on a social 
decision making approach. Some have recommended that CBA provides the most general approach 
in these circumstances but, where a complete CBA is not possible, CCA can be regarded as a 
practical alternative.
8
  We start with a brief outline of what is required to inform decisions in HTA and 
identify those methods that best meet these requirements.  We then ask whether public health 
interventions are fundamentally different from HTA and consider whether any such difference lies in 
the nature of decisions that must be made, the character of the evidence available and the objectives 
or the constraints faced.  We try to locate the fundamental choices and social value judgments that 
must be made in choosing between alternative approaches.  
 
 
2. Informing decisions in HTA 
 
2.1 The decisions  
 
Two decisions need to be made in health care.  First, given existing evidence, which interventions or 
strategies should be adopted for defined patient groups, for particular indications and in specific 
settings?  Second, is the existing evidence a sufficient basis for such a decision or is there value in 
acquiring further evidence?  If the answer to the latter question is positive, what type of evidence, 
what type of studies for which patient groups and how much evidence is required?  Where a 
technology appears to be cost-effective but uncertainty is high and more evidence would be an 
advantage, it may be better to delay implementation until the additional evidence has been acquired.  
Whether adoption should be delayed depends on the costs of reversing a decision to adopt now and 
the impact of immediate adoption on the probable generation of further evidence. 
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2.2 Analytical requirements 
 
The choice of appropriate methods for economic evaluation should be based on whether they can 
provide the information required to make these decisions.  The first requirement of any decision is 
some claim of legitimacy, which will ultimately rest on the social authority of the body with the remit to 
make these decisions and the legitimacy of the scientific and social value judgments which are 
required. Therefore, appropriate methods must make these scientific and social value judgements 
explicit so that they are open to debate, alternative formulation and falsification. Only then can their 
legitimacy be scrutinised. 
 
If they were to be as fully informed as possible, these decisions would require an estimate of the joint 
distribution of costs and outcomes, for all the alternative interventions or strategies available (i.e., not 
just alternative technologies but all the different ways existing technologies could be used), for the full 
range of possible patient groups that can defined and over an appropriate time horizon (the time 
horizon over which cost and benefits differ). Therefore, a means of explicitly structuring the decision 
problem so that all alternatives are compared and that enables the explicit extrapolation of cost and 
benefits overtime, between settings and patient groups, is required. 
 
A characterisation of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates of expected costs and benefits and 
the uncertainty surrounding the choice between the range of alternatives available is also required. 
No single study can provide all the information for the parameters relevant to costs and effects, nor is 
any single study going to be the only source of evidence.
9
 Therefore, a means of combining evidence 
from a variety of sources and of representing uncertainty is required.  Even when direct evidence 
about a parameter of interest is available it will often come from different types of study which will 
require explicit consideration of potential biases and exchangeability. More often than not, however, 
indirect evidence about parameters of interest is also available (such as evidence on functions of 
parameters, evidence on surrogate endpoints or indirect and mixed comparisons of the alternative 
technologies).
10 11
  Moreover, there will also be circumstances where neither direct nor indirect 
evidence for a parameter is available and formal elicitation of scientific value judgements will be 
required.
12
 
 
The framework of analysis also needs to reflect the iterative nature of decisions and the accumulation 
of evidence over time: as new evidence becomes available the estimates of costs and effects need to 
be updated and decisions may have to be revised.
13
  Finally, the decision rules applied to the joint 
distribution of costs and other consequences must be consistent with the stated objectives and 
constraints of the health care system.  With a single budget constraint and some view of its shadow 
price, and an objective of maximising health gains (where the measure of health gain has been 
agreed), the decision to adopt an intervention can be addressed.  The second decision of whether the 
existing evidence is sufficient or whether further evidence is required can also be formally addressed 
using value of information analysis.
14
  Similarly, the opportunity costs of delay while further 
information is acquired can also be established.
15 16
 In principle all these decisions can be made in a 
way which is consistent with the objectives and constraints of the health care system. 
 
These requirements suggest that a Bayesian decision analytic framework is appropriate, such as that 
developed within HTA.  It was such a characterisation of the requirements for decision making in HTA 
which informed the selection of methods recommended in the Reference Case for the NICE appraisal 
of health technologies.
7
  The question is whether this approach is sufficient when addressing the 
broader questions posed by public health interventions which move beyond the narrower concerns of 
HTA?  
 
 
3. Public health interventions 
 
What is really different about public health interventions compared to HTA?  The decision still relates 
to the choice of technologies or interventions for the promotion of the health of the public. Decisions 
are still to be evidence-informed. Judgments will still need to be reached about the adequacy of the 
evidence to support decisions. Granted these similarities, the question of whether a new mode of 
analysis is needed seems redundant.  It seems not to be needed.  But that easy conclusion assumes 
that the objectives, the constraints and the general quality of the evidence are also not altered in ways 
Mark versus Luke? Appropriate methods for the evaluation of public health interventions  3 
that may demand a different reference case. Addressing these three issues is, therefore, what 
concerns us in the remainder of this article.  
 
3.1 The evidence 
 
It seems plain that the mix of types of evidence for the evaluation of public health interventions will 
differ in a number of important respects from that customarily available in medical care.  For example, 
within HTA, partly due to licensing requirements, RCT evidence of the relative effect of interventions 
is often available, at least for pharmaceuticals.  This experimental evidence avoids selection bias 
within the study and provides some of the best opportunities to explore the counterfactual.  However, 
even in HTAs with a relative wealth of RCTs in the evidence base, there remain problems of 
interpretation, such as the external validity of protocol driven licensing trials, the shortness of follow-
up periods, the use of surrogate endpoints and the frequent presence of incomplete and inappropriate 
comparators.  It is the use of Bayesian methods of synthesis which has allowed these issues to be 
addressed 
17 18
 as well as incorporating other observational evidence which is almost always available 
but often ignored.
19
   
 
The evaluation of public health interventions will inevitably rest more on non-experimental evidence 
concerning effectiveness such as natural experiments, cross-section studies or studies that include 
longitudinal and panel data with appropriate statistical analysis to control for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity.  In turn, these will require an integration of the econometric and statistical 
modelling approaches that have been applied to these problems (e.g., instrumental variables
20
) within 
a broader evidence synthesis.  It will pose some new issues for synthesis methods which have, in 
HTA, focused primarily, but not entirely, on synthesis of evidence from RCTs.  These issues will 
include how to synthesis the range of evidence of incentives on behaviour and consumption which 
have health effects.  However, these are not issues that require new forms of analysis. What they do 
require is increased attention to the characteristics of empirical research that already pose 
interpretation problems in the appraisal of medical technologies.  
 
In HTA evidence directly linking an intervention to health outcomes is sometimes, though rarely, 
available. The link between the intervention and long-term outcomes must often be made through a 
chain of evidence, linking the intervention to surrogate or intermediate outcomes (such as changes in 
behaviour/consumption, or biological markers) and then linking the surrogates to ultimate health 
outcomes.  Linking surrogates to long term health outcomes and resource use may become a more 
frequent research issue in appraising public health interventions than in conventional HTA but the 
principles of how to address this issue are essentially the same.  
 
The range of alternative interventions or policies to be considered in public health will be larger than 
with personal health care technologies, with fewer head-to-head comparisons. Again, this issue is 
central in conventional applications of HTA where many of the comparisons that are appropriate to 
make are not in the RCT evidence, and many comparisons remain ones between an experimental 
technology and placebo.  Reflecting this dearth of appropriate head-to-head trial evidence,  indirect 
and mixed comparisons is increasingly used in HTA.
11
  So, once more, the challenge posed by public 
health to existing evaluative methods is neither new nor intractable.  In fact, one of the most 
interesting aspects of extending this type of analysis to public health will be the opportunity afforded to 
compare health technologies to alternative public health interventions or even to non-health sector 
options.  
 
3.2 Objectives 
 
A naïve view 
 
Current decision rules postulate a single objective that is to be maximised subject to a single 
exogenous budget constraint.  In essence, HTA simply boils down to providing the solution to a well-
specified constrained optimisation problem. Within HTA, the characterization of the exogenous 
objective function (for example, maximizing health outcome) may have been somewhat naïve. The 
naïvete arises for at least two similar but quite distinct reasons.  First, while some analysts require 
that measures of outcomes should be preference-based and developed using the axioms of expected 
utility theory, it is not at all clear that measures of HRQL actually do measure utility as conceived by 
expected utility theory.  Therefore, analysis based on the standard QALY can claim no firm 
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foundations in welfare theory.
21
  This may already constitute an indictment of HTA as conventionally 
practised and would, a fortiori, be damned in the evaluation of public health interventions. However, 
this maybe of little concern for those who are sceptical as to whether utility theory can provide either 
behavioural predictions or a suitable basis for welfare propositions about the good for society.    
 
Second, even when welfare theory is rejected as a suitable basis for decisions in health care there 
are a number of other concerns. While no one denies that health gain is not the sole outcome of 
health care, it is easy to defend health maximisation as a dominant criterion for the adoption of 
technologies into the bundle of services provided by a collectively funded health care system. In the 
case of public health, however, it is possible that other outcomes may need to be explicitly 
addressed..  Even when health gain is considered a suitable objective it may be too crudely measured 
(for example, in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) using broad preference-based measures 
of health-related quality of life (HRQL) such as the EQ5D
22
) and so fail to capture subtle yet valuable 
aspects of health outcome.  Finally a fair distribution of health outcomes is also an explicit expectation 
of public health interventions, but this aspect of evaluation has only been perfunctorily embodied in 
HTA as customarily practised.   
 
A broader view 
 
One alternative to the naïve approach is to go to the other extreme, for example to postulate the 
maximisation of individual subjective utility, using the standard axioms of welfare economics to 
identify Pareto-preferred changes as indicators of improvements in social welfare, where an 
improvement in social welfare is judged to have taken place if those who gain can compensate those 
who lose from the intervention.  Compensation can be based either on market prices that represent 
the social value of alternative activities or, when they do not, on shadow-prices assuming a first-best 
world.  Where markets do not exist, revealed preferences in surrogate or hypothetical valuation can 
be use to generate shadow prices. On the face of it, such an approach has many advantages: all 
outcomes matter in so far as they are valued by individuals (who are willing to offer or accept 
compensation); it seems to avoid explicit interpersonal social value judgements and the inherent 
apparent paternalism of specifying some exogenous objective function; it provides clear guidance on 
appropriate methods (how costs and benefits should be measured and what perspective should be 
taken); and it provides a clear definition of what is meant by efficiency. This much broader view of the 
evaluation of social policy claims legitimacy from its firm foundation in individual preferences and 
seems ideally suited to public health interventions and the evaluation of broader social policies that 
affect health. It is a view clearly expressed by Mark Pauly: 
 
“[Public] Heath care programmes should be judged in the same way as any other proposed change: 
ie the only question is do they represent a potential Pareto improvement not do they improve health 
outcomes as measured in either physical units or health state utility. It is possible that a programme 
may increase the health of some but reduce the health of others. If those that gain health outcome 
can compensate those that lose health (measured by individual willingness to pay) then the 
programme may be a potential Pareto improvement even if the health outcomes overall are lower.” 23 
 
Paulys customary clarity exposes the implicit social value judgements required to accept this 
approach, and these strong normative prescriptions come at a price: the implicit values may not 
necessarily be shared by legitimate societal decision makers; they are certainly not universally 
accepted; and they seem to contradict some quite basic values which are widely held.   This was 
clearly expressed by the author of St. Lukes gospel: 
 
“And he looked up and saw the rich putting their gifts into the treasury and He saw a poor widow 
putting in two small copper coins [mites]. And he said,  “Truly I say to you, this poor widow put in more 
than all of them: for they all out of their surplus put into the offering but she out of her poverty put in all 
that she had to live on.” Luke 21, v1-4, NAS. 
 
For Mark this is clearly nonsense: the rich gave much more than the widow (they would require or 
could offer more compensation). Presumably, he would justify this by observing that the widow was 
poor because she had made free choices over her life cycle income and consumption, including her 
decisions to participate in the labour market and her investment in human capital consistent with her 
rates of time preference!  There is no reason to intervene: to do so would be to violate individual 
preferences and might even constitute a dangerous attack on freedom itself. 
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Mark or Luke? 
 
Choosing between Mark or Luke comes down to the position taken on two issues.  The first is 
whether the current distribution of income (and the associated distribution of opportunities to invest in 
human capital and participate in the labour market) is optimal. If not, and if redistribution is possible, 
then the appropriate level of compensation can, in principle, be estimated for each alternative 
distribution, but we would need to agree which one was optimal and then adjust all compensation 
including shadow prices for marketed and non-marketed goods.  Second, the approach views society 
as a collection of individuals participating in perfectly competitive markets, maximising their subjective 
utility following the conventional economic axioms of rationality. When this view of society is applied to 
the presumed nirvana of a first-best neoclassical world, market prices do indeed represent the social 
value of alternative activities (and, when they do not, they can be shadow-priced assuming a first-best 
world).  This may be regarded as either a peculiarly optimistic or complacent view of the world which 
denies or abstracts from issues such as fellowship, solidarity, discrimination, class, imperialism and 
history.  
 
In addition, there are a number of important problems in the application of the welfare theory: the 
conditions of rationality and consistency required for individuals maximising their utility have been 
shown often to be violated;
24
 and there is a problem of aggregating compensating variations across 
individuals;
25
 the paradox of choice reversal with non marginal changes;
26
 and the general problem of 
second best.
27
  The last of these has generally received very little attention, despite the well known 
and profound result that first best solutions in a second best world may move us away from a Pareto 
optimum rather than towards one.  Since no one would argue that the world is first best, then even if 
the values implicit in welfare economic theory were acceptable its successful application in a second 
best world seems impossible. 
 
It seems clear that the strength of the normative prescriptions for social choice which flow from 
welfare theory rest on the strength of the social value judgements (and hence their ideological 
content) which are implicit in them.  The notion that a walfarist view can avoid the strong social value 
judgements required by a societal decision making approach cannot be sustained.  The difference is 
that the social value judgements required and the basis of claims for legitimacy are explicit under 
extra-welfarism
3
 principles but all too often implicit under welfarism.  Moreover, it is plain that the 
social decision makers whom analysts serve do not see the objectives of health care in the same way 
as advocates of welfarism, whereas extra-welfarism is specifically designed to accommodate the 
values of social decision makers. 
 
If not the invisible fist? 
 
If the broader view of outcome based on individual preferences expressed through the market (actual, 
surrogate or contingent) is rejected, then what are the alternatives?  There seem to be two: (a) to 
maintain the still somewhat naïve and simple objective for which there is some consensus (i.e. health 
technologies and public health interventions exist to improve health as much as possible); or (b) to 
attempt the specification of a more complex objective. Doing the latter would require specification of 
the arguments to be included, the weights attaching to each and some means by which political 
legitimacy could be claimed  that is, a rationale independent of the predilections of analysts 
themselves. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to resolve any of these issues, and no single legitimate 
societal decision maker may exist to specify how the resolution ought to be made.  However, in the 
absence of  a Leviathan, it maybe useful to look to those institutions which have been given the remit, 
and therefore some form of legitimacy, to make social decisions about health care and other sectors 
which may be relevant to public health interventions. How the valuation of outcomes across these 
different sectors might be achieved in a way which is consistent with the relevant budget constraints is 
considered below.  However, before moving directly to a relaxation of the assumptions that the 
objective function has but one argument and that there is but one budget constraint, we consider the 
case of a single health sector with and without an exogenous constraint. 
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3.3 The constraints 
 
A perfect institutional world 
 
Suppose that the decision maker can set both the budget and allocate resources within it.  Any project 
which improves social welfare as conventionally defined is to be implemented and the budget for 
health care will be determined by the resources needed to implement all projects with positive net 
benefit in CEA or positive net present value in CBA. The appropriate decision rules for CEA are quite 
clear, implement a new technology if: 
 
0., !'''' HHH cVHorVHc ,    (1) 
 
where health gain is the only benefit (validly measured by ǻH) and valued based on some social 
value of health gain (V
H
).  The additional cost of the technology (ǻc) includes any net costs falling 
inside and outside the health care budget. 
 
The decision rules in CBA are also quite clear, implement the new technology if: 
 
0,1 !'''' cBorBc ,      (2) 
 
where the benefits (ǻB) are valued based on individuals maximum willingness to pay  and ǻc include 
all shadow priced costs, not just those falling on the health care sector. 
 
Both CEA and CBA require a monetary valuation of health outcome.  The distinction is the source of 
these valuations (individual willingness to pay versus some social value of health). Clearly, and as 
discussed previously, a CEA must ensure that all aspects of outcome that are valuable are included in 
ǻH.  This may be difficult within HTA when the outcomes are all in terms of health gain but when 
applied to multiple sectors with diverse outcomes it is not clear what should be measured, how it 
should be measured and how these diverse outcomes should be valued.  However, if the social value 
judgements required by a welfarist approach are acceptable, then CBA appears much more general 
(all outcomes are included if individuals are willing to pay for them) as long as the budgets for all other 
sectors are not fixed and the decision maker has the ability to allocate across as well as within all 
sectors.    
 
A more realistic world 
 
In practice, decision makers with the remit to allocate resources within sectors generally do not also 
have a remit to set their budget and allocate resource across sectors.  A more realistic world is one of 
exogenous budget constraints.  The decision rules for CEA in health care are again quite clear,
28
 
implement the new technology if:  
 
0., !'''' HH cHorHc OO ,     (3) 
 
where Ȝ represents the ǻcH/ǻH of the health care that will be displaced by the additional costs of the 
new technology (1/ Ȝ represents the shadow price of the budget constraint).  If the existing budget 
allocation is regarded as not just exogenous but also legitimate and in a relevant sense socially 
optimal then Ȝ=VH. Existing budgets can only be said to be suboptimal by making reference to some 
social value of health outcome, i.e., we can regard the health care system to be under-funded if Ȝ<VH 
and if all costs are health care costs (ǻcH).  However, allocation decisions within a single sector with a 
single objective and constraint do not require reference to an estimate of V
H
 because the same 
allocation decisions would be made irrespective of the value of V
H
, provided that it is positive. 
 
Appropriate decision rules using CBA are now less clear.  Simply observing that the cost benefit ratio 
is less than 1 or that net present value is positive is no longer sufficient.  We need to know whether 
the benefits offered by the new technology exceed the benefits which will be displaced elsewhere in 
the health care system.  The technology should be implemented only if: 
 
0, !'''' JJ HH cBorBc ,     (4) 
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where Ȗ represents the cost benefit ratio of the health care which will be displaced and 1/ Ȗ represents 
the shadow price of the budget constraint.  Now we can regard the health care system to be under 
funded if Ȗ<1 and if ǻc =ǻcH, assuming that the individual willingness to pay which generates ǻB is 
regarded as the appropriate social valuation of health outcome. 
 
The apparent generality of CBA is realised only in a perfect political and institutional world with no 
explicit budget constraints.  Once an exogenous constraint is introduced similar problems are faced 
by both CEA and CBA.  In both cases we now need an estimate of the shadow price of the budget 
constraint.  We also need to know which costs fall on the constraint, since these are the only costs 
which will displace other activities.  Similarly other benefits, in the form of cost savings which do not 
accrue to the health care budget, cannot offset costs which do.  For these reasons, both HTA in 
general and the reference case of the NICE methodological guidance
7
 restrict the perspective for 
costs to those falling on the health and personal social services sectors.  However, there are 
potentially important elements of cost (e.g. to patients and carers) and benefits (e.g., productivity 
gains) which may fall outside these sectors. NICE policy is that these should be presented in a non 
reference case analysis. 
 
Unfortunately, the NICE guidance is vague about how these other costs and benefits will be balanced 
against the health care and PSS costs and health benefits, simply stating that they maybe taken into 
account.  This problem is generally dealt with in an unsatisfactory way in HTA because there are no 
mechanisms to internalise such external effects. Similarly, the existence of an exogenous constraint 
also undermines the rationale for shadow pricing in CBA since the relevant costs are those that 
actually fall on the constraint, not the shadow price costs. For example, the shadow price of a new 
pharmaceutical will be substantially lower than the price actually faced by the health care system (due 
to monopoly rights granted by patent protection).  Public health interventions with substantial costs 
and benefits falling on many different exogenous budgets pose these problems more dramatically for 
both the societal decision making and welfarist approaches.  
 
A still more complex world 
 
The allocation problem with exogenous constraints can be examined more completely when 
formulated as a mathematical programme.
29
  Initially consider a health sector alone with an objective 
of maximising health outcome (H) or the monetary value of heath benefit (B
H
) by choosing treatment j 
within programme k for population i subject to a single budget constraint for health, CH:    
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The solution to the dual of this simple linear programme provides 1/Ȝ, or 1/Ȗ, which, if used in the 
simple decision rules described, would determine an optimal selection of health technologies. 
However, there are three problems. First, the information requirements for even this very simple 
problem are enormous, requiring knowledge of all the costs (falling on the constraint) and all the 
health outcomes (or monetary benefits) of every competing alternative treatment for each programme 
and for every definable population group.  For this reason estimates of Ȝ, or Ȗ have in practice to be 
made based on incomplete and imperfect information.  Second, even when attention is confined to 
the health care system, recognition of multiple constraints leads to much more complex solutions.  For 
example, the introduction of a simple budget constraint in each time period means that decision rules 
based on Ȝ, or Ȗ are no longer adequate.30  Third, once the costs and benefits outside health are 
recognised, then the allocation problem becomes much more complex.  
 
For example, consider education with the objective of maximising educational outcomes (E) or the 
monetary value of education benefit (B
E
) by choosing policy j within programme k for population i 
subject to a single budget constraint for education CE.  The allocation problem within education could 
be considered in isolation from the impact on health outcomes and costs, just as the allocation 
problem in health can ignore any impact on educational outcomes and costs. However, in principle, 
the allocation problems within these two sectors can be solved simultaneously accounting for their 
respective budget constraints (solving for their respective shadow prices, 1/ȜH and 1/ȜE) and the 
effects of health technologies on education outcomes and costs and those of educational 
programmes on health outcomes and costs.  This requires specification of either a single objective or, 
where outcomes are measured on some utility scale or in natural units, specification of the relative 
weight of educational outcome compared to health outcome (į).  If all benefits are valued in monetary 
terms using CBA, they may be regarded as commensurate (each are valued relative to the common 
numeraire of consumption) and the objective will be to maximise total monetary benefit:  
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This type of formulation can evidently be extended to any number of sectors including the wider 
economy. Benefits for each sector may be measured in any combination of natural units, a utility 
scale or a monetary metric. However, if all sector outputs are not commensurate and valued relative 
to some common metric such as consumption then each must be valued relative to each other. When 
the wider economy is included they must also be valued relative to consumption in some legitimate 
and socially acceptable way.  Aside from the difficulty of validly measuring outcomes and specifying 
the relative social value of each, the more fundamental problem is posed by the informational 
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requirements.  Full information of all the costs and all the benefits falling on every sector for each 
competing alternative intervention across all programmes and all population groups for every sector 
would be required (this is similar to the scale of the problem of second best). While the specification of 
these informational demands offers no practical solution to the problem of evaluating interventions 
with multiple effects and multiple constraints, it demonstrates quite clearly that welfarist CBA offers no 
simple solution (the information requirements are equally demanding). 
 
A pragmatic world 
 
An alternative to attempting to solve the whole allocation problem across all sectors simultaneously in 
order to evaluate a single intervention is to focus on the impact of the intervention at the margin of 
each sector. If the existing allocation between the public sector and the wider economy and across 
the public sectors is regarded as not just exogenous but also legitimate and in a relevant sense 
socially optimal then the outcomes (or monetary benefits) within each sector can be valued based on 
informed estimates of the shadow price of each of the budget constraints faced.  The impact of an 
intervention can then be expressed in terms of the net benefits falling on each sector.  For example, a 
proposed intervention (j) which has an impact on outcomes and costs in both health and education 
will generate additional net benefit in health (ǻNBjH) and in education (ǻNBjE) compared to current 
practice: 
 
H
j
H
j
H
j
H
j
H
j
H
j cBorcHNB JO '''' ' ,.    (7) 
E
j
E
j
E
j
E
j
E
j
E
j cBorcHNB JO '''' ' ,.     (8) 
 
The intervention should clearly be implemented if ǻNBjH > 0 and ǻNBjE > 0, since the gains in H and E 
are greater than the outcomes which will be displaced in each sector,  similarly the intervention should 
be rejected if ǻNBjH < 0 and ǻNBjE < 0 (more outcomes or monetary benefit would be displaced than 
gained in both sectors).  However, in many circumstances net benefit will be positive in one sector 
and negative in another. In such cases, implementation can be based a simple compensation test 
where the compensation required by a sector is based on net benefit.  This ensures that the valuation 
of outcomes (or monetary benefits) is consistent with the existing budget allocation between sectors.  
This is illustrated in Table 1 for 6 notional interventions having different payoff patterns. 
 
Table 1.   A simple compensation test 
 j Health Education  Decision Compensation 
1 ǻNBjH > 0 ǻNBjE > 0 (ǻNBjH + ǻNBjE) > 0 Accept None required 
2 ǻNBjH > 0 ǻNBjE < 0          .. .. (0- ǻNBjE) from H to E 
3 ǻNBjH < 0 ǻNBjE > 0          .. .. (0- ǻNBjH) from E to H 
4 ǻNBjH < 0 ǻNBjE < 0 (ǻNBjH + ǻNBjE) < 0 Reject None required 
5 ǻNBjH > 0 ǻNBjE < 0          .. .. H cant compensate E 
6 ǻNBjH < 0 ǻNBjE > 0          .. .. E cant compensate H 
 
Thus, intervention 2 could represent an improvement in the quality of school meals. The gains in 
educational outcomes may not offset the costs falling on education (ǻNBjE < 0) but the improvements 
in health outcomes and the possible reductions in health care costs means that ǻNBjH > 0. The policy 
will be worth while implementing if the health sector can compensate education for the loss in net 
benefit (0-ǻNBjE) and still regard the intervention to be cost-effective. Similarly, intervention 3 could 
represent the use of Ritalin for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder or parent training programmes 
which may not be cost-effective when the impact in health outcomes and costs alone are considered 
but the improvements in educational outcomes and possible reductions in special education costs 
means that the education sector could compensate the health sector for the loss in net benefit. The 
issue is not whether any particular perspective (e.g., societal or health system) is to be preferred.  
Rather that a multi-sectoral perspective is considered in which estimates of the impact on the 
outcomes deemed to be relevant across each sector and the actual costs (not the shadow prices) 
falling on each constraint are quantified. 
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It should be clear that the compensation required cannot be based only on the costs falling on 
different sector. Compensation should account also for the impact on outcomes across sectors.  By 
expressing compensation in terms of net benefit based on ȜH and ȜE, the valuation of outcome and 
resource use in each sector is consistent with existing budget allocations across sectors.  Indeed,  
ȜH/ȜE represents the value of health relative to educational outcomes implied by the current budget 
allocation and the productivity of current health and education interventions, i.e., as if existing budget 
allocations are socially optimal.   
 
Public and the private sector 
 
The approach can be generalised to any number of sectors having explicit constraints as well as to 
the wider economy.  It can also be generalised to consider policy decisions made by bodies which do 
not hold their own budget but make decisions which impact on other budgets and the wider economy. 
For example, legislation about workplace safety will impose costs on employers in the wider economy 
but will also improve health outcomes and may reduce health care costs. Whether such a policy 
should be regarded as worthwhile depends on whether the health sector could compensate the 
private sector for the additional costs but still regard the policy as cost-effective. The question is: do 
the health improvements valued at their opportunity cost (the additional health budget which would be 
required to generate the same improvement in health) net of health care costs, exceed the costs 
outside the health sector?  If so, it is more efficient to generate health through the proposed policy 
than by expanding the budget for health care. Conversely, where health care interventions provide 
benefits to the wider economy (such as gains in productivity), they may be regarded as worthwhile if 
the private sector could compensate health care sector for any loss of net benefit.     
 
If the compensation required for each intervention is actually paid then the impact of a decision on the 
net benefits in other sectors will be internalised.  However, there typically exist no mechanisms for 
such transfers. Moreover, the payment of compensation for each intervention would entail genuine 
transaction costs. A more pragmatic approach might be to record the compensation required between 
sectors for implementation decisions made over a budgetary period.  The net compensation required 
could be used to inform budget allocation for the next period.  For example, if interventions 2 and 3 in 
Table 1 were implemented, then the net compensation required may be very small. This would be 
sustainable only if net compensation was either a small proportion of total budgets or if making 
changes in budgets based on net compensation became a credible political option.  If that latter was 
the case, a public health intervention having, say, substantial costs (ǻNBjH <0) but also substantial 
productivity benefits to the wider economy, could be implemented only if there were confidence that 
the next periods budget would reflect compensation needed from the private sector to the relevant 
public sector budgets.  
 
Are budget allocations optimal? 
 
The approach outlined above takes the existing allocation of resources to and within the public sector 
as, not only exogenous, but also in some relevant sense socially optimal (the shadow prices are equal 
to social value of outcomes so that V
H
=ȜH and VE= ȜE), i.e., the shadow price of the constraints is used 
to infer the value of sector-specific outcomes relative to each other and to consumption.  This may not 
be unreasonable if we believe that the political and institutional processes that led to these allocations 
are broadly legitimate and represent social values which may not be captured in other ways (e.g., 
through the market whether real, surrogate or hypothetical).  However, if budget allocations are 
regarded as exogenous but not socially optimal then this poses questions regarding the basis upon 
which such a claim can be made and what would be optimal allocations.  Both require an alternative 
and appropriate social valuation of outcomes. Of course, only an unflinchingly welfarist approach 
provides a clear prescription: the appropriate social valuation is the individual willingness to pay (not 
some average social valuation which imposes external value judgments on individual preferences). 
Since these valuations have already been used to generate ǻBjH and ǻBjE the decision rule for 
intervention j remains unchanged and should be implemented if: 
 
0)()( !'''' ' EjEjEjHjHjHjj cBcBNB JJ    (9) 
 
This net benefit of the intervention across sectors accounts for both the shadow price of the fixed 
constraints and the value of the outcomes in each sector relative to consumption. Observing that 
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ȖH/ȖE=1 would suggest that current allocations are consistent with individual preferences, whereas ȖE<1 and ȖH/ȖE >1 implies that there should be a reallocation from health to education (or, if ȖH is also 
less than 1, that both sectors are under funded). 
 
If social valuation of outcomes based on individual willingness to pay through real, surrogate or 
hypothetical markets is not regarded as acceptable for the reasons outlined in Section 3.2, but the 
claim of sub optimal budget allocation is still maintained (i.e. the legitimacy of the political and 
institutional processes leading to the allocations are not a sufficient basis for social optimality), then 
some other legitimate social valuation of sector-specific outcomes relative to consumption (V
H
 and 
V
E
) is required and implied.  The decision rule for intervention j which has impacts on health and 
education outcomes and costs must be revised to reflect both the social value of outcomes and the 
shadow price of the budget constraints.
31
  The intervention should be implemented if:  
 
0)()( !'''' ' EEjjEHjHjjHj cEVcHVNB OO ,  (10) 
 
Recall that in (3) when considering a single sector, with a single objective and constraint, the value of 
V
H
 did not effect the allocation decisions within that sector (it is simply a question of technical 
efficiency). However, when there are impacts on multiple sectors with different outcomes and when 
budgets are not regarded as socially optimal, the social value of outcomes matters for whether an 
intervention should be adopted. For example, for intervention 2 in Table 1 ǻNBj = (ǻHj.ȜH-ǻcjH)+(ǻEj.ȜEǻcjE)>0 but it is possible that VH(ǻHj.-ǻcjH/ ȜH)+VE(ǻEj.-ǻcjE/ ȜE)<0, if both sectors are 
under funded and if education is more under funded than  health, i.e., 1<V
H
/ ȜH<VE /ȜE.  In fact social 
valuations of sector outcomes only matter when ȜH/ȜEVH/VE. It is possible that budgets are not 
optimal (both sectors are under funded) but both sectors are equally under funded.  In these 
circumstances measures of net benefit in table 1 which are based only on the shadow price of the 
constraints will lead to the same allocation decisions as using social valuations in (10).  
 
Clearly, claims about optimal allocation within and between the sectors can only be made with 
reference to some social values, e.g., observing that ȜH/ȜE=VH/VE would suggest that current 
allocations are consistent with the socially determined relative value of health compared to 
educational outcomes. Whereas if V
E
>ȜE and VH/VE<ȜH/ȜE implies that there should be a reallocation 
from health to education and if V
H
 is also greater than ȜH  then both sectors are under funded. 
 
Imposed or implied social values? 
 
As discussed previously in Section 3.2 no single legitimate social decision maker exists to provide 
these social valuations and, if Mark is rejected in favour of Luke, it is not clear how they should be 
specified.   However, any claims made about the optimality or otherwise of existing budget allocations 
appeals to such social values.  The choice for analysts seems to be to either impose a view of social 
value (whether based on the market or some imaginary Leviathan) or evaluate interventions as if 
existing allocation reflect social values.  The former is much more ambitious (possibly to the point of 
being over reaching), the latter is more humble, but at least exposes the policy implications of and 
social values implicit in existing budget allocations made by those who claim some social legitimacy to 
make these decisions.  This approach might have earned Keynes approval: 
 
“If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level 
with dentists, that would be splendid!” (p.373)32;  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
There are pragmatic as well as principled reasons why a multi-sectoral societal decision making 
approach offers advantages.  In the absence of a perfect political and institutional world in which first-
best allocations are possible, exogenous constraints exist and decisions must be based on some 
assessment of their shadow price. There are, however, no simple ways of integrating the impacts on 
costs and benefits in other sectors within existing decision rules.  The information requirements for 
formally solving the whole allocation problem across all sectors, accounting for multiple effects and 
constraints, are excessively demanding.  Welfarist CBA offers no solution (the information 
requirements are the same) even if the implicit social value judgements are regarded as acceptable. 
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Unfortunately, if they are not acceptable, it is also the case that no single legitimate societal decision 
maker exists to specify the arguments and relative weights which would form some overall objective 
function.  
 
However, if objectives and a measure of outcome for each sector can be based on  institutions with a 
legitimate remit to make social decisions about allocations within each particular sector, then a 
pragmatic solution of the sort we have developed exists. Similarly, rather than impose some relative 
valuation of these outcomes, we can use the valuation implied by the current allocation of resources 
within the public sector and between the private and public sector, i.e. using the allocation decisions 
of those who have the remit and sufficient legitimacy to make them. This does not mean that the 
analyst must regard the status quo as in any sense correct or optimal but should conduct evaluation 
as if it is, given the explicit objectives, existing allocations and their implied values.  By making these 
implications explicit, the question of whether existing objectives are appropriate and whether the 
implied valuation of outcomes across sectors matches social preferences is exposed to public 
scrutiny. In all cases the legitimacy of any prescription will rest on the legitimacy of the decision 
makers, the processes and the institutions.  Explicitness and transparency about what current budget 
allocation decisions imply will serve as proximate tests of whether any claims for legitimacy are well-
placed. 
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